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A B S T R A C T
Climate change is increasing the risks of weather-related disasters in many regions around the world. This has an
adverse socio-economic impact on households, farmers and small businesses. Some strategies for effectively
managing climate related disasters include index based insurance products, which are increasingly offered as
alternatives to traditional insurance, particularly in low-income countries. However, the uptake of index in-
surance remains low, which can be partially attributed to the inherent problem of basis risk. This review assesses
the problem of basis risk that occurs when insurance payouts depend on an index that is imperfectly related with
actual losses experienced by the insurance policyholder. Special attention is paid to the design of the index,
quality and sampling data, the estimation of basis risk and its influence on insurance demand, and index-in-
surance supply. The paper concludes with several policy recommendations including the need for a systematic
approach to quantify the magnitude of basis risk, to inform index design with participatory approaches, to offer
index insurance through existing risk sharing networks. Moreover, we recommend to improve policyholders
access to information about their risk and measures they can take to limit risk, create an enabling environment
for a well-functioning insurance market, and lastly to have an integrated approach that incorporates insurance
with other mechanisms that reduce basis risk.
1. Introduction
Climate change can have major impacts on human society through
increasing the magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events that
can trigger a natural disaster or emergency [25]. The economic losses
resulting from natural disasters have already increased worldwide and
are expected to increase further in the future [26]. For instance, the
economic costs of natural disasters have increased from $25 billion per
year in the 1980s to $ 175 billion in 2016 [44]. These trends in natural
disaster risks highlight the need to develop policies that limit, and help
society cope with, the impacts of future natural disasters. It has been
suggested that multi-sector partnerships can be effective to encourage
adaptation to climate change risks, which consist of collaborations
between different private or public agents and institutions [7]. Estab-
lishing such partnerships in financial compensation arrangements for
climate risks, such as insurance, is important since these can aid in
managing natural disaster risks and can decrease the immediate and
long-term financial impacts associated with natural disasters [36]. Re-
cent research has shown that climate risk insurance is a priority area for
many countries with at least 38 countries mentioning climate risk in-
surance approaches in their Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs). In addition, another four countries feature the topic in their
more elaborated National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). These countries
represent some 4 billion people including some of the world's extreme
poor [35].
Index-based insurance products were first proposed as alternatives
to traditional claim - based insurance starting in the 1950s when the
U.S. started to experiment with area-yield index insurance [4]. Ap-
proximately fifty years later, weather and satellite based index in-
surance products are increasingly being piloted in both developed and
developing countries. Index-based insurance products are primarily
used as financial instruments to mitigate agricultural and livestock
mortality risks resulting from natural disasters. Managing risks to
agriculture is particularly important in developing countries where, for
example, social unrest is often associated with low agricultural pro-
duction and incomes [14]. Livestock mortality risk is also cumbersome
for pastoralist communities in, for example, semi-arid lands in the Horn
of Africa [28]. Developing countries are particularly interested in
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alternative risk management interventions that are affordable and easy
to administer, such as index insurance products, which can stimulate
economic growth and reduce poverty [1]. The combination of climate
and socio-economic change will likely increase weather-related risks
and can result in even greater demand for insurance coverage to limit
the socio-economic impacts of climate change [6].
Index-based insurance products rely on an external signal to provide
coverage for covariate risks2 and are attractive to developing countries
for several reasons. The index used by these products on which payouts
are based, are designed using either direct measures such as area-yield
index insurance contracts in the U.S using the average annual crop
yields, or the indexes are based on external measurement from e.g.
weather or satellite information. This is clear from Table 1, which
shows the indexes used in the studies that we reviewed. The index re-
duces the moral hazard problem likely with traditional insurance pro-
ducts. This is because individuals cannot influence the amount of the
insurance compensation as the payout of claims is based on an external
index. Moreover, linking indemnity payments to external indicators
rather than the policyholder's actual losses can reduce transaction costs
since there is no need for lengthy verification processes, which are
difficult to conduct in remote areas [40]. Moreover, the financial cov-
erage provided by an index-based insurance can stimulate investments.
For example, in the anticipation of a payout in the case of a bad year,
index insurance policyholders can choose to invest in high risk and
high-return activities, such as investing in higher revenue producing
but risker crops [12].
Despite efforts by governments in both developed and developing
countries to expand index insurance coverage, the demand for these
products is low, particularly for low-income groups [15]. One of the
underlying issues for such low demand is basis risk. Basis risk is in-
herent to index insurance products, and occurs when insurance payouts
depend on an index that is not perfectly correlated with the actual
losses experienced by the insurance policyholders. In other words, basis
risk can result in insurance payouts that are higher or lower than actual
losses, and the payouts may deviate from policyholder expectations
about coverage. Basis risk can result in low index insurance demand
and have the effect that households resort to undesirable mechanisms to
deal with downside risks, like reducing consumption or selling their
valuables [14]. Moreover, many existing studies lack empirical evi-
dence on the magnitude of basis risk under various index insurance
products, which makes it difficult to assess how effectively these pro-
ducts reduce risk.
This paper provides an overview of the different approaches used to
measure basis risk and the impact of basis risk on insurance demand.
This paper aims to analyze the current status of index insurance pro-
ducts and the link between the negative impacts of basis risk on the
functionality and demand for index insurance products. It provides
insights for countries that are considering to implement index insurance
products that enhance resilience-building capacities towards climate-
related impacts, such as extreme weather events and disasters. The
policy recommendations that follow from the synthesis of key papers on
index insurance can inform various climate risk insurance initiatives
(e.g., Global Partnership for Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and
Insurance Solutions; UNFCCC's institutions and policies, including the
set-up of the Clearing House for Risk Transfer, etc.).
We conducted a systematic review of the available literature con-
sisting of peer-reviewed published and unpublished articles about basis
risk and index- based insurance3 by searching 3 main databases with
varying combinations of keywords.4 We include study sites from both
developed and developing countries. General discussion papers and
those that did not focus on the empirical relationship between index
insurance and basis risk were not included. A qualitative instead of a
quantitative review was conducted, because only a handful of studies
have comparable basis risk variables.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the different types of basis risk considered in the existing lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the methods used to create the index in-
surance contracts. Section 4 discussed the quantification of basis risk.
Section 5 examines the effects of basis risk on index insurance demand.
Section 6 lists and describes other mechanisms to facilitate the devel-
opment of index-based insurance markets. Section 6 concludes and
proposes avenues for future research.
2. Types of basis risk
In order to be able to determine the magnitude of basis risk, it is
Table 1
Studies included in the review focusing on index insurance for agricultural and livestock mortality risk.
Study Country Type of index Type of insurance product Risk covered Factors influencing basis risk
[50] Morocco Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (wheat, barley, maize) Design error
[53] Nicaragua Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (various) Design error
[21] India Rainfall Actual Crop yield (groundnut and castor) Design error
[37] US Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (cotton) Design error
[47] Germany Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (wheat) Design error and idiosyncratic variance
[23] China Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (corn, wheat) Design error
[10] Ecuador Rainfall Actual and hypothetical Crop yield (maize, rice) Design error
[42] India Rainfall Actual Not crop specific Design error
[20] Mali Area-yield Hypothetical and actual Crop yield (cotton) Design error
[25] Ethiopia Rainfall Hypothetical Crop yield (various) Design error
[48] US Rainfall and heat Hypothetical Crop yield Design error
[19] Ethiopia Rainfall Actual Crop yield n.d.
[3] US Area-yield Actual Crop yield Design error
[17] US Area-yield Actual Crop yield Design error
[4] US Area-yield Actual Crop yield Design error
[11] Kenya Normalized Difference Vegetation Index Actual Livestock Idiosyncratic variance and design error
[30] Kenya NDVI Actual Livestock Idiosyncratic variance and design error
[31] Kenya NDVI Actual Livestock Idiosyncratic variance and design error
[33] Ghana Rainfall Actual Agricultural Idiosyncratic variance
2 This paper distinguishes between idiosyncratic risk as household level shocks un-
related to one's neighbor versus covariate risk as community shock whereby households
suffer similar shocks as their neighbor (adapted from [5,31]).
3 Index-based insurance included: area-yield index insurance, satellite-based index
insurance and weather index insurance products.
4 The following search terms were used in Google Scholar, Science Direct and Web of
Science: basis risk AND index insurance AND insurance AND agricultural insurance; basis
risk AND product design basis risk AND spatial basis risk AND temporal basis risk AND
geographic basis risk AND local basis risk; area yield index insurance AND basis risk;
weather index insurance AND basis risk, index insurance AND insurance demand. The
search was conducted in the period June 2014 until December 2017.
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important to come up with a unified definition of basis risk. Such a
definition is lacking in the current literature as is clear from Table 2
which shows that a variety of definitions has been used in the studies
that we reviewed. This is because the majority of these studies do not
have unified methods to quantify basis risk. Basis risk is measured ei-
ther ex ante using a correlation analysis of hypothetical simulated index
values and insurance payouts or ex post by comparing the actual fre-
quency of payouts versus the amount that would be predicted by the
original policy conditions. Additionally, basis risk has a variety of
causes and the lack of a systematic approach to weighting the different
types of basis risk makes it difficult to have a single definition.
In light of these challenges, we define basis risk as the weak cor-
relation between the selected insurance index and the individual loss
outcomes.5 Traditional indemnity based insurance covers both idio-
syncratic risk6 and covariate risk. By construction, index insurance is
only appropriate to address covariate risk because it allows the insurer
to predict losses and determine indemnity payments for a larger
number of policyholders and for a wide geographical zone. Inherently
this leads to basis risk in two ways, as is also apparent from Table 1
which demonstrates the key factors influencing basis risk for both ac-
tual insurance products and for simulated hypothetical insurance pro-
ducts for 19 studies. First, by constructing index insurance only against
covariate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks are left uninsured. The larger the
area and the more heterogeneous the individual risks faced by the
policyholders, the larger the idiosyncratic variance and the poorer the
index will be in predicting individual outcomes. Second, basis risk can
also arise from design error, which is a portion of the potentially in-
surable covariate risk. This takes place when, for example, the reference
weather station is too far away from the individual farms and the index
insurance does not account for the important variability in weather
conditions. Design error can also occur when the insurance contract
fails to account for the sensitivity of losses to weather conditions at
different times in a year, such as the sensitivity of yield to rainfall
variation during each stage of the crop growing cycle. This implies that
measuring the rainfall sum during only one stage of the crop growing
cycle can result in poor estimation of the actual losses [37].
3. Methods to design the index insurance contract
In order to understand how index insurance programs will be af-
fected by basis risk in practice, it is important to compare the methods
used to both design the index insurance contract and to quantify the
level of basis risk as shown per study in Table 3.
In order to design an index insurance contract in a way that mini-
mizes basis risk and to price the risk ex ante the introduction of the
product, it is important to properly estimate the probability distribution
of the index and have good quality longitudinal data of the variables
that determine the index, such as weather records. Moreover, properly
designing the index insurance contracts also requires data on expected
losses. This data is often difficult to obtain because it is expensive to
collect especially in developing countries and its availability is also
dependent on the different types of index insurance contracts. Not
having the proper data in place leads to a misrepresentation of the true
probability distribution of the index and can result in a poor correlation
between the index and individual loss outcomes.
Historical weather data are the primary pre-requisite for pricing and
designing a weather-based index insurance products [8]. In order to
fully understand the historical weather patterns, historical data should
ideally be of high quality, uninterrupted and range from at least 20–30
years [52]. There is some indication from the current studies that his-
torical rainfall data are available in some of the countries ranging from
15 to 31 years (see Table 4). However, some countries have incomplete
rainfall datasets, which means that proxy data are required to fill the
years where no data are available [10,50]. This problem is acute to low-
income countries with a limited number of weather stations and poor
documentation of historical weather patterns [43]. Indeed, the three
studies in the U.S. and Germany have some of the more extensive da-
tasets and weather stations distributed across the country (see Table 4).
High basis risk can be expected when deploying a proxy for missing
weather data and when relying on only a single variable (i.e., rainfall)
in determining, for example, crop yield growth [34].
The data used to design area-yield index insurance are often ag-
gregated at the country level or use few farm-level observations, which
makes it difficult to account for the spatial and temporal heterogeneity
and can lead to either upward or downward biased yield estimates
compared to the farm-level situation [13]. Additionally, unlike rainfall
data, area-yield insurance requires estimates of area yields that gen-
erally require costly local data collection and are more difficult to ob-
tain especially in developing countries [41]. To account for spatial and
temporal heterogeneity and decrease the problem of basis risk, Awondo
et al. [3] used pseudo-simulated country yields and expected losses
using farm geospatial climatic data. Barnett et al. [4] and Deng et al.
[17] used on-the-ground farm level yield data estimates from a risk
management agency and complemented this with country-level yield
data. Despite efforts to improve the collection of area-yield data, further
efforts are needed to meet the necessary data requirements to effec-
tively design the area-yield index insurance contracts.
The index-based livelihood insurance programs calculate the in-
demnity, by combining household level herd data with satellite-based
vegetation data that indicates the amount and vigor of vegetation based
on photosynthetic activity at a high spatial resolution (Normalized
Difference Vegetation Index, NDVI). Aside from obtaining a high spatial
resolution, combining satellite data with on the ground household-level
data is one way to reduce design risk and improve the performance of
the index [11]. Generally long records (minimum of 25 years) of index
data is needed to correctly estimate livestock mortality risk and to
Table 2
Basis risk definition.
Study Basis risk definition
[50] Not specified
[21] Correlation between insurance payout and risk to be insured/household consumption risk.
[3,4,17,23,37,42,47,53] Correlation between index and individual losses/outcome.
[10] Basis risk arises due to idiosyncratic risk, large geographical area, and from design error. The risk of being insured and having a loss but receiving no
payment.
[20] A probability that the farmer will not be indemnified even when losses occur.
[25,33] The probability that the index records a good state of the world, when the individual experiences a bad state of the world.
[48] The risk that payoffs do not correspond to the underlying exposures.
[11,19] Basis risk is the difference between the losses actually incurred and the losses insured.
[30,31] Remaining uninsured risk or residual risk due to imperfect association between experienced losses and indemnification based index values.
5 For households, the correlation between the index insurance payout and the in-
dividual loss outcomes will be important. The focus on payout would require an analysis
of the insurance coverage and deductibles, which is not included in the basis risk lit-
erature.
6 Idiosyncratic risk refers to risk posed to the individual and not experienced by all the
households in the area, such as animal damage to crops and localized pests and diseases.
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accurately calculate the related insurance premiums. Vrieling et al. [51]
observe that data from current operational satellites used for NDVI span
a maximum of 15 years in places such as Kenya. The uncertainty around
index probability estimates can result in the insurance companies
charging higher premiums which subsequently decreases insurance
demand.
Skees et al. [50], Giné et al. [21] and Elabed et al. [20] have stressed
the importance of including feedback from community members and
farm groups in the design phase of the index ex ante the introduction of
the product in order to design indices that better predict individual
losses. This helps to create more sophisticated contracts that closely
mirror actual losses and, therefore, can reduce the problem of basis risk.
For example, Elabed et al. [20] showed how cotton cooperatives leaders
in Mali helped to design multi-scale index insurance pilots that scaled
down the index to the village cooperative level as opposed to only the
district level. Yields were measured at the village cooperative level in
order to account for the spatial variability of rainfall in the region and,
hence, to reduce geographic basis risk. The second trigger level set at
the district level limits the moral hazard problem by verifying that the
rainfall reporting at the village level reflects the actual insurance cov-
erage required by those villages. In particular, the district level trigger
is used to assess the accuracy of the loss reporting at the village level.
4. Quantifying basis risk
Most studies have approximated the impact of basis risk on index
insurance payouts and crop revenue fluctuations ex post the introduc-
tion of the insurance product. In particular, studies examining the
rainfall index insurance conducted a correlation analysis. This includes
determining the strength of the correlation between weather indices
measured at different weather stations using statistical analysis (see
Table 3). The analysis consists of selecting pairs of weather stations
such as a general weather station and a weather station that is 100 km
away.
The results from the correlation coefficients allow to determine the
area up to where the index is still representative for the individual
losses. The correlation coefficient is then later used to determine the
impact of basis risk on revenue production and to analyze whether the
farmers are better or worse off using index insurance products.
However, the weakness with using the correlation analysis is that it
assumes a homogenous environment and does not account, for ex-
ample, for topographical differences that can potentially influence a
Table 3
Methods used to design the index insurance contract and quantify the impact of basis risk on index insurance.
Study Method to design an index Method to quantify basis risk Method to determine potential risk reduction Method to determine insurance
demand
[50] Community feedback Not specified Simulation Not applicable
[53] Not specified Statistical analysis Not specified Not applicable
[21] Community feedback and statistical
analysis
Not specified Not specified Willingness to pay study
[37] Index value simulation Not specified Simulation Not applicable
[47] Index value simulation Statistical analysis Simulation Not applicable
[23] Index value simulation and burn
analysis
Statistical analysis Simulation Not applicable
[10] Index value simulation Comparison of actual to theoretical
payout
Comparison analysis of index insurance versus
traditional insurance
Not applicable
[42] Statistical analysis Not specified Survey Randomized experiment
[20] Index value simulation and
community feedback
Comparison of actual to theoretical
payout
Simulation Simulation and survey
[25] Not specified Not specified Not applicable Willingness to pay study
[48] Burn rate analysisa Statistical analysis Simulation Not applicable
[19] Statistical analysis Not specified Not applicable Randomized experiment
[3] Statistical analysis Simulation Comparison analysis of index insurance versus
traditional insurance
NA
[17] Statistical analysis Statistical analysis Comparison analysis of index insurance versus
traditional insurance
NA
[4] Simulation Not specified Comparison analysis of index insurance versus
traditional insurance
NA
[11] Statistical analysis Comparison of actual to theoretical
payouts.
NA NA
[30] Statistical analysis Statistical analysis NA NA
[31] Statistical analysis Statistical analysis NA Randomized experiment
[33] NS NS NA Randomized experiment
a The burn analysis predicts the insurance payoffs by examining how the contract would have performed in the previous years (Spicka and Hnilica, 2013).
Table 4
Study characteristics related to the design of the index insurance contract.
Study Time series of rain data Time series of yield or livestock
mortality data
[50] Proxy and actual data for 21
years
21 years
[53] 15 years 9 years
[21] 25 years NS
[37] 10 years 10 years
[47] 20 years 13 years
[23] 31 years 31 years
[10] Not specified 10 years
[42] Not specified NS
[20] Not specified 10 years
[25] Not specified NS




[17] NS 30 years of country level area yield
data and 4–10 farm level yield data
[4] NS 10 years
[11] NDVI data in real-time every 10
days and dates to 1981.
17 years
[30] NDVI data 4 years
[31] NDVI data 8 years
[33] Approx.50 years of rainfall
data.b
NS
a Although most weather stations date back to after 1945, some have as little as one or
two years of data for the entire 75 year data period.
b For second year of experiment, used 33 years of data (though not every year offered
complete data).
K.Y. Clement et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 28 (2018) 845–853
848
local weather event.
Most of the reviewed studies evaluated the risk reduction potential
of insurance by applying a simulation analysis (see column 4 in
Table 3). Risk reduction refers to insurance payouts that compensate
revenue deviations resulting from extreme weather events. A simula-
tion analysis is used in most cases to compare insurance payouts for
different altitude and geographic coordinates [48]. In a second stage,
studies used a simulation analysis to determine the risk reduction po-
tential of insurance by comparing crop revenues over an observed
period of time with insurance and without insurance [23,37,47,50].
The advantage of using simulations is that it allows flexibility to con-
struct more complex insurance policies and to determine whether basis
risk distorts the insurance payoffs. Despite this advantage, there are still
some notable limitations with this approach. For example, the studies
did not account for access to other risk management tools such as di-
versification of agricultural activities or asset accumulation, nor did
they simulate the impact of future climate change on the risk reduction
potential of index insurance products.
The simulation analysis showed that basis risk has an impact on
insurance payouts and the level of revenue risk that can be reduced
using insurance payouts. The reviewed studies demonstrate that index
insurance payouts do not equal incurred losses as a result of basis risk.
Norton et al. [48] found that if insurance contracts do not account for
key geographic variables that can impact index insurance performance,
individual farmers can get stuck with non-compensated losses. The
study found that as the distance between the insured farms and re-
ference weather station increases, the difference in pay-offs also in-
creases, and the index insurance payouts will be less accurate. Despite
these findings, Castillo et al. [10] found that area yield index insurance
resulted in significantly greater payouts ($202.77) than traditional in-
surance ($161.56), but only during the rainy season. However, it is
difficult to compare this study to the rest as it focuses on area-yield
index insurance, which, in theory, is subject to lower levels of basis risk
as compared to rainfall index insurance.
Aside from unpredictable insurance payouts, three studies found
that index insurance products with severe basis risk could not suffi-
ciently protect farmers from crop revenue fluctuations [23,37,47]. For
instance, two studies we reviewed demonstrated how index insurance
products offer greater protection from revenue fluctuations under low
basis risk compared to a scenario with high basis risk.7 For instance,
insurance contracts with a strong correlation between the rainfall index
and crop yields varying between 57% and 85%, and hence a low basis
risk, resulted in a weighted average relative overall risk of 42% without
insurance compared to an overall relative risk of 36% and 30% with a
5% and 10% insurance cover respectively [50]. In contrast, insurance
contracts with higher levels of spatial basis risk led to a reduction in the
guaranteed return that farmers would accept from an index insurance
under zero basis risk [37]. This is exactly what the two studies below
demonstrate.
Musshoff et al. [47] showed that excluding basis risk translated into
zero revenue risk fluctuations for the farmer. However, under both
geographical and local basis risk the reduction of the standard deviation
of the revenue payout was smaller than under no basis risk. Further-
more, Heimfarth and Musshoff [23] found that the extent to which
precipitation-based index insurance increases the risk reduction po-
tential not only depends on basis risk, but also on the insured crop and
on the location of the weather stations. For instance, the standard de-
viation of corn revenue is reduced by 24.4% under index-based in-
surance compared to a reduction of the standard deviation of less than
1% for wheat index insurance. In other words, the deviations of grain
revenues were better compensated by insurance payouts for corn than
for wheat. Moreover, insurance payouts were more accurate when
weather stations were placed on the mainland as opposed to coastal or
mountainous regions.
Area-yield index insurance contracts performed either equally as
well, or better compared to traditional insurance contracts in certain
states in the U.S. and for particular crops. However, the area-yield index
insurance performed worse than traditional contracts when the pro-
blem of basis risk was included in the analysis, especially when the
area-yield fails to account for localized changes in crop yield [3,4,17].
Index based livelihood insurance products were proven to work best for
covariate losses and have smaller design risk, but by construction they
do not account for idiosyncratic risk [11,30,31]. Moreover, if the index
insurance contract is designed to capture covariate losses the popula-
tion can also fair better than the index in the short run. Only Elabed
et al. [20] find evidence of this in their simulation analysis and define
this as a false positive payout where a policyholder does not experience
a loss, but the insurance product triggers a payout anyway, so the
policyholder profits.
A study by Jensen et al. [32] on index-based livestock insurance
(IBLI) in Kenya and Ethiopia found that the insurance products im-
proved the situation of the policyholder even when indemnity payouts
did not occur. Particularly, the authors stated that IBLI products “im-
proved peace of mind about drought exposure” (Jensent et al., 2015).
Moreover, households with IBLI coverage increased their investments
in livestock veterinary and vaccination services, and reduced their herd
size. These changes to production strategies led to an increase in milk
productivity of livestock and the total value of milk produced [32].
4.1. Challenges of analyzing the magnitude of basis risk for index insurance
contracts
Although the section above demonstrates that basis risk can result in
index insurance payouts that do not correlate well with individual
losses and insufficient protection to farmers from crop revenue fluc-
tuations, the magnitude of basis risk for the different index products is
difficult to quantify. This makes it hard to conclude whether index in-
surance products are indeed risk reducing. This is partially because of
the lack of data available to both design index insurance contracts and
to subsequently analyze the level of basis risk. Another key factor is that
basis risk arises due to a variety of factors – design error, idiosyncratic
risks, etc., - and the current studies have not yet established a sys-
tematic approach on how to weigh the types of basis risk by level of
impact. Lastly, the three index insurance contracts use different units.
Area-yield index insurance are policies explicitly tied to yields by
transforming raw yield data into an index scale that reflect the levels of
yield. In contrast, weather-based and satellite-based index insurance are
implicitly tied to yield (in case of weather index) or livestock (in case of
IBLI products) because there is an indirect relationship between the
index and actual yield outcomes.
5. The impact of basis risk on index insurance demand
All of the demand studies showed that index insurance participation
is higher when basis risk is low, but only a few studies analyzed how the
magnitude of basis risk influences demand by using actual household
level data. Giné et al. [21] examined demand for an index insurance
product in Andhra Pradesh, India. A regression analysis of insurance
demand of 752 people showed that a decrease in basis risk resulted in
an increase in weather index insurance demand. The study was based
on the assumption that those growing the two cash crops castor and
groundnut, for which the weather index was designed, will subse-
quently have less basis risk and hence results in higher insurance de-
mand. This assumption ignores the possibility that growing the top cash
crop might not be a measure farmers choose to reduce the problem of
basis risk, but rather an issue of crop choice made by more trained and
well-informed farmers to maximize their profits. The results showed
7 Low basis risk refers to a scenario in which there is a strong correlation between the
index and individual loss outcomes, while high basis risk refers to a scenario where there
is a weak correlation between the index and individual loss outcomes.
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that the probability of purchasing insurance indeed increases by 59%
for groundnut crop insurance and 34% for castor crop insurance due to
lower basis risk. The authors supported this by a survey that showed
that 24% of the respondents stated that basis risk was one of the reasons
for not buying index insurance.
Elabed et al. [20] conducted a demand study with a sample size of
331 people. The study simulated the impact of basis risk on Malian
cotton farmers under conventional and a two-scale trigger index. The
two-scale trigger insurance was employed to reduce geographical basis
risk by designing an insurance contract with one trigger at the district
level and one at a lower geographical scale, which is more relevant to
the farmer such as the village he/she lives in. The results suggested that
the two-scale trigger index had different statistical properties than the
conventional insurance. In particular, the former decreased the in-
cidence of false negative payout from 70% to 35% and completely
eliminated the problem of a false positive payout. The study found that
demand for the two-scale contract is higher than an equally priced
conventional contract. The authors supported their results by empirical
findings from a one-year multi-scale pilot whereby 30% of the target
group agreed to purchase the product. Although these results do not
directly indicate that basis risk results in lower index insurance de-
mand, it does signify that contracts with a trigger level closer to those of
the policyholder result in greater demand.
Similar findings were also reported by Hill et al. [25] in a will-
ingness to pay (WTP) study that showed that geographical basis risk
resulted in a significant decrease in index insurance demand. Using a
sample size of 1400 households and the distance from the weather
station squared as a proxy for basis risk, the double-bounded dichot-
omous choice contingent valuation model showed that basis risk af-
fected WTP significantly and negatively. These findings were supported
by another survey conducted by these authors, which revealed that
30% of the respondents indicated that basis risk prevents them from
continuing to purchase the index insurance product.
Other studies measured demand indirectly using willingness to pay
studies with strong assumptions on the relationship between basis risk
and index insurance demand, while others used randomized experi-
ments as coarse proxies for idiosyncratic risk in order to understand the
impact of basis risk on insurance uptake (see column 5 in Table 3). For
example, Mobarak and Rosenzweig [42] and Dercon et al. [19] hy-
pothesized that informal risk sharing, such as purchasing index in-
surance as a group, decreases basis risk because it offers mutual pro-
tection against idiosyncratic losses under the condition that not all basis
risk is perfectly correlated among its members. Mobarak and Ro-
senzweig [42] randomly assigned the sample participants to be placed
at different distances from the automated rainfall stations to determine
what impact basis risk would have on index insurance demand. All the
participants were informed about the nearest located weather station
and hence, the study included the perceived and actual basis risk var-
iation. The study showed that a higher level of informal risk sharing for
idiosyncratic risk increased index insurance demand with basis risk.
Assuming that the perceived distance to the weather station is a proxy
for basis risk, for every kilometer increase in distance, the demand
decreased by 6.4%.
Dercon et al. [19] study randomized the effect of insurance training
on demand whereby one group received training on how risk sharing
can reduce the problem of basis risk and the other only received
training on the individual benefits of insurance. This study examined
how insurance demand was framed and how people perceive the pro-
blem of basis risk. The study similarly found that framing index in-
surance as beneficial for groups through a decrease in basis risk resulted
in an increase in the probability of purchasing insurance by 29%
compared with the group which received no training related to the
benefits of informal risk sharing.
The limitation of both of these studies is that they examined groups
who are already pre-disposed to manage and share their risks. Mobarak
and Rosenzweig [42] only examined people belonging to a caste
system, the jati, which play a large role in business, investments and
risk sharing in major parts of India [45,46]. Dercon et al. [19] sampled
people who are members of funeral societies that pay a premium for
funeral insurance and other forms of insurance to some or all the
members called ‘iddirs’. Members of the iddirs tend to better under-
stand the insurance and how it functions than those not belonging to
the group [18]. A challenge with both studies is that it can be difficult
to disentangle the impacts of belonging to the risk-sharing group that
resulted in greater insurance demand or the impact of the insurance
product itself on demand.
With the exception of one study by Jensen et al. [31], the majority
of the demand studies did not have access to actual household level
data to identify which factors better estimate index insurance demand
by separating the two components of basis risk – idiosyncratic and
design risk. This was the only study that distinguished between the
magnitude of basis risk on insurance demand. The authors found that
households with greater average idiosyncratic risk were less likely to
purchase insurance and that design risk played a much smaller role in
index insurance demand. Consequently, it can be concluded that re-
ducing design risk will not completely overcome the basis risk problem
on influencing insurance demand.
Price and non-price factors can also negatively affect demand for
index insurance products (see Table 5). Basis risk had a greater negative
impact on insurance demand when the price of the contract was high,
which suggests that the impact of basis risk on demand will be smaller
for a product that is cheaply priced [23,40]. Risk aversion was also
associated with low insurance take-up because basis risk causes un-
certain damage reimbursements which makes the insurance less at-
tractive for risk averse individuals. Jensen et al. [31] found that a better
knowledge of index insurance products and basis risk had no impact on
insurance uptake, while Dercon et al. [19] found a positive relationship
between knowledge and index insurance demand. Overall, the impact
of basis risk on index insurance should not be studied in isolation to
other influencing factors on demand.
6. Index insurance approaches and other mechanisms to facilitate
the development of index-based insurance markets and limit basis
risk
The problem of basis risk not only influences index insurance de-
mand, but can also influence the supply of index insurance products.
For instance, in Ethiopia researchers are examining the impact of in-
corporating so-called “gap insurance” into the design of an index in-
surance product in order to cover the risks not covered by the index.
This verification process has been shown to increase the number of
insurance policies sold, but the project still requires designing a market
strategy, capacity building and reinsurance engagement to scale-it-up
Table 5
Other factors influencing index insurance demand.






Index insurance price Negative Yes [25,33,42]
Risk aversion Negative Yes [20,21]
Basis risk Negative Yes [19,20,21,25,31,42]a
Wealth Positive Yes [21,25]











Yes [31] (0); [19] (+)
a Note this is the only study that separate between the type of basis risk (design or
individual) and that determines which is more important for demand.
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[29]. There are other examples of risk management initiatives that have
developed mechanisms to offset or reduce the impacts of potential basis
risk associated with index insurance. For example, some insurance
companies retain the basis risk component rather than passing it on to
the clients such as the MiCRO programme in Haiti. Another example is
Mexico's FONDEN which provides other financial resources in situa-
tions where basis risk prevents a pay-out [49].
Other studies have looked at the impact of the risk-layering ap-
proach that looks at index insurance in combination with other risk
financing instruments [9,39,49]. This approach includes “identifying
the various layers of disaster risk, who bears each level of risk, and the
possible risk transfer instruments available to each layer” [39]. In order
for index insurance to be effective, these products need to be better
integrated with other mechanisms to reduce basis risk. For example, in
Mongolia's Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project (IBLIP) herders
take out commercial insurance to cover themselves against small losses,
while larger losses are covered by a social safety net funded by the
government which transfers risk to private insurance and reinsurance
markets.
Bundling insurance with financial and non-financial services, such
as training, is a potential means of increasing its perceived value among
potential customers and more effectively meeting their needs [2]. Cole
et al., [16] compare the levels of education of farmers enrolling in
rainfall insurance in India, and find that literate farmers were 15%
points more likely to take up rainfall insurance and use it to plant cash
crops. In a previous pilot, Cole et al. (2011) had found that participation
in education programs on rainfall insurance more than doubled the
uptake of rainfall insurance. Providing readily available information to
insurance policyholders about their risks and mechanisms to avoid
those risks is another key obstacle. For instance, insurers often charge a
fee for accessing the information that they generate and maintain as
part of their business model. In addition to this, governments can also
restrict the information they disclose for reasons of sensitivity or be-
cause information-sharing channels are simply not there [49]. The most
vulnerable population is the least likely to pay for access to informa-
tion. In turn, governments should provide an enabling environment to
ensure information reaches the most vulnerable. The weather index
insurance initiative by PepsiCo in India is one such example, which
combines capacity-building and information exchange with the in-
surance products. Policyholders are offered technical advice on pro-
duction practices and weather information and advisories through text
messaging [22].
Subsidies can help with creating an enabling environment to get a
market for index based insurance started, and appear to be commonly
used for this purpose. Rates of insurance premium subsidization vary
greatly between different types of insurance products as well as be-
tween different countries and sectors, but tend to be higher for index-
based schemes. Mahul and Stutley [38] reviewed agricultural insurance
schemes in 65 countries (developed and developing), and found that
almost two-thirds provide substantial premium subsidies. In their re-
view of 39 agricultural insurance schemes operating in developing
countries, Hess and Hazell [24] show that of the index-based options,
subsidization is lowest in contract farming and input supplier schemes,
and highest in credit-linked, direct and safety-net insurance schemes.
Subsidization rates in the latter scheme are 80 per cent on average. The
few large-scale agricultural index-based schemes in middle- and low-
income countries are heavily subsidized [49]. In India, nearly one
quarter of agricultural households participate in index insurance mar-
kets, and government subsidies account for 60–75 per cent of premium
costs [26]. Two of the largest index insurance schemes in the world are
the Chinese Agricultural Scheme and India's National Agricultural In-
surance Scheme, which cover around 160 million and 15.9 million
policyholders respectively [24]. Additional research can examine
whether subsidies are an effective way to increase demand for index
insurance products that have a high level of basis risk.
7. Conclusion and recommendations
Index-based insurance products are primarily used to mitigate the
negative impacts of agriculture and livestock mortality risks and are
especially attractive for developing countries because of its lower costs
than traditional claim based insurance. Providing index-based in-
surance often depends on a risk sharing partnership between an in-
surance company and insurance customers, like farmers, sometimes
supported by a governments or NGOs with start-up capital. Despite
their advantages, the demand for index insurance products is lower
than expected and there is limited empirical evidence to suggest that
index insurance products are indeed risk reducing. Our literature re-
view demonstrates that basis risk hampers the functioning of index
insurance products and lowers insurance demand. However, while
there are empirical studies that try to quantify the impact of basis risk
on risk reduction and insurance demand, there are few systematic and
complete analyses of these impacts. This can be attributed to a number
of gaps in the current literature such as a lack of a clear definition of
basis risk. To ameliorate this challenge, the review proposed that basis
risk is defined as the weak correlation between the selected insurance
index and the individual loss outcomes. The other gap in the current
literature is that most studies only analyze a portion of basis risk, but
basis risk is a multi-faceted problem with a variety of causes and the
impacts of basis risk can be quite large if all these aspects are con-
sidered. To further complicate the analysis, there are many ways to
design the index insurance contracts – area-yield index insurance,
weather based index insurance, satellite based index insurance – and
each approach has its advantage and disadvantage as discussed above.
However, to the authors’ knowledge, there is not yet one study that
provides an empirical comparison on the variation of basis risk across
the different types of contracts.
Furthermore, despite the call for a more rigorous empirical analysis
of basis risk dating back in the literature as far as 10 years ago, only 18
studies have been identified in the review that focus on the empirical
relationship between index insurance and basis risk. Moreover, the
impact of basis risk on risk reduction and insurance demand is difficult
to estimate, primarily due to the fact that the data used to design the
contracts and to analyze the level of basis risk are often incomplete.
They are either too costly to obtain such as when countries have a
limited number of weather stations, or the documentation of historical
data patterns is poor. Moreover, rather than using actual household
level data of the target group to estimate the impact of basis risk on
insurance demand and the actual performance of index insurance pro-
ducts, the literature often uses proxies for basis risk or simulation
analysis. This makes it challenging to properly estimate the level of
basis risk inherent in the index insurance contract design.
This review has identified key areas to improve future research on
basis risk and index insurance products. Suggestions for enhancing the
data quality include not relying on proxy data or single variables to
determine individual losses for weather-based contracts and to com-
plement data aggregated at the country-level with farm level observa-
tions for area-yield index insurance. Farmers can be the ultimate source
of information to limit basis risk. Participatory approaches that involve
community groups and farmers in the index design phase can result in
products with low basis risk. Additionally, designing more sophisticated
contracts that closely mirror actual losses and, therefore, can reduce the
problem of basis risk can result in greater demand. Moreover, basis risk
depends on various factors and future research should develop a sys-
tematic approach that weighs the impacts of the various types of basis
risk for the range of index insurance products. Additional studies are
also needed to determine whether index insurance products can effec-
tively manage risks in real-life as most of the evidence comes from
hypothetical insurance products or short-term pilots. Moreover, index
insurance products should not be examined in isolation to other risk
management tools.
There are different pathways to foster index insurance markets at
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the national level, especially in relation to the agriculture sector and
food-security objectives. This can include climate literacy campaigns to
national insurance stakeholders, or generally increasing government
capacities to promote climate risk management and insurance.
Countries implementing index insurance approaches also need to have
the proper enabling environment including data provision, regulatory
and supervisory frameworks, capacity development of key institutions.
Providing readily available information to insurance policyholders
about their risks and mechanisms to avoid those risks is another re-
commendation. Furthermore, the insurance industry can contribute to
the standardization of available data, which further supports analysis
and action.
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